THREE CENTURIES OF INEQUALITY IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA by Peter Lindert et al.
THREE CENTURIES OF INEQUALITY 
IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA 
Peter H. Lindert 
Department of  Economics 
University of  California 
One Shields Avenue 
Davis, California 9561  6-8578 
Working Paper Series No. 97-09 
Revised January, 1998 
Note:  The Working Papers of the Department of Economics, University of California, 
Davis, are preliminary materials circulated to invite discussion and critical 
comment.  These papers may be freely circulated but to protect their tentative 
character they are not to be quoted without the permission of the author. For A.B. Atkinson and F. Bourguignon (eds.), 
Handbook of  Income Distribution. 
Revised draft, January 1998 
THREE CENTURIES OF INEQUALITY IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA 
Peter H. Lindert 
University of  California - Davis 
Arthur Burns was delighted with what he read in Simon Kuznetsls 
massive new book in 1953.  Kuznets found that incomes were getting more 
equal.  For Burns, this finding re-wrote all the rules for the perennial debate 
over inequality and redistribution through government: 
"Few Americans and fewer Europeans are aware of  the 
transformation in the distribution of  our national income that has 
occurred within the past twenty years - a transformation that has 
been carried out peacefully and gradually, but which may already be 
counted as one of  the great social revolutions of  history  .... 
"Considerable income inequalities still exist in our midst, but 
they require careful interpretation .... the upper stratum is 
dominated by the most productive age, sex, and educational groups 
in the population .... 
"These conclusions of  Kuznets' investigation have great 
significance for the American people.  If  we are to look forward 
constructively to a material reduction of  income inequalities in the 
future, we must seek to attain it principally by raising the 
productivity of  those at the bottom of  the income scale rather than by 
transferring income from the rich to the poor ....  Substantial further 
government redistribution of  income may ... affect adversely the size 
of  the national income, while it cannot improve appreciably the 
living conditions of  the great masses."  (Bums 1954, p. 137). 
Page 1 Burns was neither the first nor the last to base a sermon about inequality on 
some historical data.  His enthusiasm stands out in retrospect, however, 
because it came at a time when an epochal equalization of  incomes seemed 
tangible to many.  Seeing him in that dawn of  discovery, and marveling at his 
breath-taking leaps of logic, we naturally wonder about the longer and deeper 
history.  Was he right?  How long had that egalitarian trend been going on 
before the 1950s? Was the non-meritocratic part of inequality really stripped 
away in those past twenty years?  Would the change be permanent?  And 
what would Burns have written about inequality movements "within the 
past twenty years" if  he were writing at the end of  the twentieth century? 
We can now take stock of  past inequality movements in Britain and 
the United States with the help of  recent progress on three fronts:  (1) New 
experiences since the 1970s; (2) archeological progress, yielding better 
retrospective data on the more distant past; and (3) a highly-developed algebra 
that decomposes inequality movements into their proximate causes, in order 
to trace more fingerprints of  the underlying causal forces than simple 
inequality aggregates can reveal. 
A number of  conclusions about inequality movements stand out, 
despite all the data flaws and the nuances we have learned to expect from 
movements in the distribution of  incomes among fluctuating human 
populations: 
(1) Income and wealth inequality definitely rose over the first 150 years 
of  U.S. history.  Britain may also have had an early period of  rising inequality, 
but the most likely period of  rising inequality (1740 - 1810) was earlier than 
most writers have imagine$. 
(2)  Britain and America, and indeed most high-income countries, did 
indeed experience a shift toward more equal pre-fisc incomes in the first half 
of  the twentieth century, as Kuznets believed.  The leveling was brief and 
sharp for America, but proceeded more gradually for Britain.  Most or all of 
Page 2 the leveling took the form of  a narrowing of  the gaps between the top and 
middle ranks. 
(3)  From the 1970s to the 1990s income inequality clearly rose in these 
two countries.  This widening reversed most or all of  the previous 
equalization of  pre-fisc incomes.  There was probably still a net equalization of 
post-fisc (disposable) incomes over the whole three centuries, however. 
Exploring these movements has deepened our know1 dge of  their 
underlying causes:  "\ 
(4)  Even "pre-fisc" income inequality moves partly in response to 
redistribution through government.  The rise of  tax-transfer progressivity 
equalized the ownership of  human and non-human capital, and its later 
stasis played a permissive role in the recent return of  rising inequality. 
(5) Government redistribution cannot explain all of  the epochal 
reversals in inequality trends, however.  Factor-market forces and economic 
growth would have produced a similar chronology of  rises and falls in 
income inequality even without shifts in the progressivity of  redistribution 
through government.  The dominant causal forces here are demographic 
change, unbalanced technological advance, and Engel effects. 
(6)  These underlying forces change overall inequality both through 
movements in relative factor prices and through compositional shifts in 
group weights. 
(7)  The key to future improvements in our understanding of  the forces 
.driving income inequality lies in simultaneously explaining the pre-fisc 
inequality, the inequality df  political voice, and government redistribution 
between rich and poor.  Only with such a three-sided simultaneous system 
will we have a satisfactory explanation of  the Robin Hood paradox, which 
notes that redistribution toward the poor tends to happen least in those times 
and polities where it would seem most justified by the usual goals of  welfare 
policy. 
Page 3 I.  CHOOSING ISSUES, MEASURES, AND METHODS. 
Our conventions for addressing, measuring, and explaining inequality 
movements have governed what we are prepared to see, for better and for 
worse.  Before turning to the long history that can now be mapped, and 
surveying the usual approaches, we should note where the literature has 
placed its lampposts, illuminating some aspects of  inequality but leaving 
others in the dark. 
A.  Redistributable Income or Living Standards? 
Much follows from one's choice of  a social issue for research and policy 
debate.  Our whole view of  inequality hinges on whether we care more about 
the inequality of  economic resources that economic policies might 
redistribute than about the overall inequality of  living standards.  The 
division is sharp here. 
Economists'  exploration of  inequality movements has seldom strayed 
far from the issue that dominates most of economics:  What is the proper role 
of  government in our lives?  Income inequality is of  interest primarily as an 
exhibit in the debate over how, or whether, government should redistribute  , 
income and wealth.  The (valid) pre-occupation with this perennial debate 
shapes all choices of  inequality measurement.  In  the choice of  independent 
variables (influences on inequality trends), considerable attention is spent on 
allocating the credit or blame for inequality trends between government 
redistribution, market movements, and the distribution of  human capital.  It 
matters to most writers whether the credit for a reduction in inequality should 
be given to government and labor unions, or to the normal workings of  the 
marketplace, or to equalization of individuals' human capital. 
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responsive to government manipulation and to market forces, such as taxable 
market income or full-time annual earnings.  When the subject turns to the 
health and longevity side of  inequality, our usual instinct is to view health 
and death as things experienced by families at different positions in the 
income ranks, or by families headed by persons in different socio- 
occupational classes.  Thus infant mortality is something suffered 
differentially by poor and rich parents, and we measure its impact at the 
household level (e.g. Titmuss 1943).  The implicit policy question is how 
much mortality could be reduced and equalized by redistributing economic 
resources (income, health care, etc.) across households. 
Alternatively, one could care primarily about the inequality of  overall 
living standards themselves, not just the income part of  them most 
manipulable by changing government policy or other economic institutions. 
Such a broader concern for inequality of  human living standards would give 
far more attention to inequalities in individuals'  health and length of  life in 
1  particular.  Even if we valued whole lifetimes only according to people's 
total lifetime consumption, the literature on economic inequality would look 
much different from the literature to be surveyed below.  Robert Summers 
(1956) noted this, and Lee Lillard (1977) offered indirect measures of  the 
inequality of lifetime income and consumption.  Such measures, however, 
stay close to the annual income idea by positing a fixed economic lifetime.  A 
bigger second step is to follow the inequality of  lifetime consumption among 
birth cohorts of  individuals, taking account of  the inequality in the length of 
.life. The inequality of  living standards, as proxied by lifetime consumption, is 
/ 
governed more by movements in infant mortality than by movements in the 
inequality of annual income.  Improved infant survival, even if  evenly 
spread across economic classes, can convert an upward drift in income 
inequality into a clear trend toward more equal lifetime consumption across 
individuals (Lindert 1991, pp. 213-4, R.V. Jackson 1994). 
Page 5 The usual economic treatment of  inequality resists giving such heavy 
weight to newborns as citizens, preferring to concentrate on infant death as 
something experienced differentially by parents in different social classes. 
The literature says much about mortality gaps by income or social class, little 
about how the greatest reduction in individual-lifetime inequality may have 
been achieved by advances in medicine and health care that did not favor any 
class.  Since this chapter's  task is to share the literature's pre-occupation with 
the debate over income inequality, differentials in life expectancy will be 
2  noted only en passant, as extra twists on inequalities between income ranks. 
B.  The Pre-fisc Focus. 
Much of  the literature on income inequality movements chooses to 
follow measures of  the inequality of  pre-fisc, or original, incomes, rather than 
the post-fisc disposable incomes people actually receive.  This frequent choice 
has a rationale and a major implication. 
The rationale is to concentrate on the larger intellectual challenge.  The 
directly redistributive component of  post-fisc inequality is transparently 
attributable to government, at least in the accounting sense.  The task of 
explaining movements in pre-fisc or original income is more challenging. 
Many economic forces compete for explanatory roles.  Indeed pre-fisc is not 
even pre-fisc, inasmuch as prior fiscal interventions, such as estate tax, affect 
the inequality of  this year's original incomes. 
The implication to bear in mind is that the literature focusing on 
.movements in pre-fisc inequality, even when it recognizes feedbacks from 
past taxes and transfers to 'current original income, hides much of  the role of 
government in shaping the inequality of  current disposable income. 
C.  Causal Methods. 
Page 6 Different analytical techniques compete for our energies and attention, 
so that using one more fully can crowd out other insights.  The treatment of 
income inequality has passed from simple factor-price and factor-share tales, 
to a more sophisticated decompositional accounting based on identities, to the 
use of  regressions and large-model simulations to weigh exogenous causal 
forces.  Time spent at each step is time not spent at the next. 
Before the mid-twentieth century the usual instinct was to imagine 
fixed shares of  the population for different economic classes, each rewarded by 
a different factor price, and to assume that movements in rents and profit 
rates and wage rates summarized the movements in inequality.  While this 
simple equation of  factors and quantile ranks had some validity back when 
the classical economists wrote (Lindert 1986), it was obsolete long before it was 
abandoned. 
Simon Kuznets (1955) ushered in the current era of  decompositional 
inequality accounting with his often-cited example of  how shifting group 
weights could generate inequality trends without any movement at all in 
factor prices.  The algebra has grown in sophistication, as evidenced by other 
chapters in this volume.  Identifying the behavior of the different 
components makes it possible test numerous side-implications of  each 
hypothesis about the sources of  inequality. 
While decomposing inequality into its parts sharpens our sense of  how 
inequality changes, it leaves open the question of why.  Each of  the classes 
into which decompositions divide an inequality change can affected by 
several underlying forces in unknown proportions, and each of  those forces 
typically shapes inequality though more than one component. 
Decompositional analysis must share the stage with statistical and 
simulation-model (e.g. computable general equilibrium) techniques for 
weighing the contributions of  underlying forces. 
D.  The Kuznets Coniecture. 
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rather well, a corner from which it is time to move.  This is the literature 
testing whether or not inequality follows an inverted-U curve, a Kuznets 
curve, as per capita income rises. 
Despite its name, Kuznets never drew such a curve.  He was content to 
offer a verbal conjecture about how income inequality might move, and to 
use a tale of  compositional shifts and some common sense to suggest 
explanations.  He was rightly modest about the international data base he had 
at his disposal, and described his conjectures about trends as "... perhaps 5 
percent empirical information and 95 per cent speculation, some of  it possibly 
tainted by wishful thinking" (Kuznets 1955, p. 26). 
Kuznets did not feel the same about the rise as he did about the fall of 
inequality.  That inequality tended to decline at some advanced stage of 
development, he seemed quite confident.  He barely asserted -- rather, 
wondered about -- the possibility of  an earlier rise.  His confidence in his 
explanations for it all were similarly mixed:  He emphasized the role of 
sectoral shifts as an engine of  inequality, and mused more vaguely about the 
possible importance of  the demographic transition (Kuznets 1955). 
The Kuznets curve has to some extent tyrannized the literature on 
inequality trends.  Energies that could have moved earlier into exploring the 
underlying causes of  inequality were diverted into a debate over whether 
there was or wasn't an inverted U curve, either in history or in postwar 
international cross-sections.  Like other writings, the rest of  this chapter will 
show both theoretical and empirical reasons to doubt that countries must 
follow such a rise and fall in inequality.  It is time to move onto explorations 
that proceed directly to the task of  explaining any episodic movement, 
without bothering to relate it to the Kuznets Curve. 
Page 8 11.  WAS THERE A RISE IN INEQUALITY SOMETIME BEFORE 1914? 
"[As a] conjectural conclusion .... I would place the early phase in 
which income inequality might have been widening, from about 
1780 to 1850 in England; from about 1840 to 1890, and particularly 
from 1870 on in the United States; and, from the 1840's  to the 1890's 
in Germany."  (Kuznets 1955, p. 19) 
The top candidates for rising inequality, in Kuznets's view, were those 
epochs that the debates of  the 1960s would call "industrialization" or "take- 
off," including the classic dating of  Britain's Industrial Revolution. 
Was it true?  Our interest has remained strong since 1955, and our 
views have changed.  Pioneering work by Lee Soltow has amassed an 
impressive array of  primary data.  Soltow doubts that there was any period of 
sustained and serious widening of  inequalities in either Britain or America. 
Rather, he emphasizes that inequalities were traditionally stark before they 
narrowed dramatically across the twentieth century.  Jeffrey Williamson and 
I, by contrast, see early widening and later narrowing of  inequality in both 
countries, though not with the timing conjectured by Kuznets.  Jan Luiten 
van Zanden has posited an early rise in inequality by arguing that most 
economies of  Western Europe ascended a "super-Kuznets curve" before 
industrialization, sometime between the sixteenth century and the late 
eighteenth century.  The evidence, and the additional patterns of  interest, 
3  need to be viewed for Britain and America separately. 
/ 
A. Britain. 1688 - 1914. 
For Britain before 1914, our best guesses are necessarily eclectic.  There 
is little choice but to weave an archival quilt of  indirect clues on income 
inequality.  The main pieces of  primary material are (1) the social tables used 
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measures of  personal wealth based on probate records and occasional tax 
assessments, (3) the paths followed by a few dozen wage series, (4) land-rent 
series, and (5) early partial tax returns. 
Britain's early income distributions start from educated works of 
fiction, those social tables drawn up by Gregory King, Joseph Massie, Patrick 
Colquhoun, R. Dudley Baxter, A.L. Bowley and others.  Each of  these experts 
had access to the best miscellany of  data available in London at the time.  The 
first three of  them, at least, had axes to grind.  King seemed intent on warning 
that the nation had only a limited capacity to raise tax revenues for wars 
against France.  Massie railed against the sugar monopoly.  Colquhoun 
highlighted the nation's achievements and its ability to afford more poor 
relief.  Such dangerous estimates need to be cross-checked and revised with 
the help of  all the records unearthed by subsequent scholarship.  Weighing 
them carefully has yielded useful tentative revised estimates of  the whole 
distribution of  class-average incomes per household (Lindert and Williamson 
1982,1983). 
Table 1 and Figure 1 summarize the income distribution estimates for 
England-Wales and the United Kingdom since 1688.  We focus on top-rank 
income shares because the underlying data aggregated the poorest ranks of 
society into a few large classes, blurring our view of  inequalities below the 
median household before 1914.  The estimates imply that Britain's inequality 
was higher between 1688 and 1911 than anytime since, though the gaps in the 
1990s approach those of  1911.  There is no clear early widening of  the income 
gaps, though the period 1759-1802 (or, probably, from the 1740s to the 1810s) 
gives signals of  a rise in thd share received by the richest.  There is also the 
suggestion that income inequality declined gently in the last five decades 
before World War I, though the 1911 figures are based on highly aggregated 
distributions. 
[Table 1, Figure 1 and their notes about here.] 
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in 1759-1802 and a possible slight decline in 1867-1911, should not accepted on 
the basis of  the revised social tables alone.  We need to see what other 
evidence says about the suggested long-run stability, the apparent net rise of 
1759-1802 (or similar dates), and the possible decline between 1867 and 1911. 
We have three main kinds of  additional clues available:  (1) 
Movements in factor-price ratios, (2) estimates of  movements in the 
inequality of  wealth or property income, and (3) and estimates of  movements 
in the inequality of  human earnings. 
The first set of  clues uses a crude factor-price ratio, the ratio of  land 
rents to wage rates.  For an early era in which land still commanded a 
significant share of  national product, land rents alone can represent much of 
what was happening to the average reward for the use of  property.  And for 
England and Wales as late as 1867, land was almost exclusively an upper-class 
asset.  Land rents accruing to the top decile of  households were 13 percent of 
their income versus only 1 percent of  the income of  the other 90 percent of 
households.  Stated differently, about 89 percent of  land rents were earned by 
that top decile (Lindert 1986, p. 1155). In such a society, any rise in the ratio of 
land rents to the wages of  common labor would imply a rise in the top 
decile's income share, other things equal.  As it happens, the only period 
between 1688 and 1914 in which the rent/wage ratio clearly rose was circa 1750 
- 1810, roughly the period in which the social tables show their only rise in 
the top-decile and top-quintile income shares. 
5 
By contrast, the separate estimates of  wealthholding inequality and of 
/ 
earnings inequality do not follow the same chronology.  The next set of  clues 
consists of  wealth distributions worked up from large samples of  probate 
6  inventories.  Wealth is not income, of course, but it sheds indirect light in 
two ways:  by showing the assets on which current property income is based, 
and by reflecting the wealth accumulated from earlier total incomes. 
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classes -- landed gentry, merchants, yeomen, craftsmen, and so forth -- one 
finds a striking widening of  the wealth gaps between 1810 and 1875.  The top 
landed groups and merchants accumulated at a prodigious rate, it would 
seem, with their wealth growing far faster than that of  professionals, 
shopkeepers, yeomen, or craftsmen.  Marx might have been pleased with 
such estimates, were it not for the fact that even the middling groups gained 
in absolute real wealth and held their share of  the population, instead of 
/  slipping down into the proletariat. 
Yet the rise in wealth inequality vanishes when the personal wealth 
figures are weighted and combined into a size distribution for England and 
Wales.  As Table 2 makes clear, the wealth share held by the top five percent 
of  adults (approximately the top 10-11 percent of  household heads) was high, 
but not clearly changing any time before this century.  The lack of  trend is 
consistent with the dramatic widening of  class wealth gaps between 1810 and 
1875, simply because the very richest groups (landed aristocrats and 
merchants) were a declining share of  the adult population, and land was a 
declining share of  national wealth and national income.  The evidence on 
non-human wealth thus shows wide inequality gaps before 1914, but no clear 
8  trend.  Combining this trendless property distribution with the available 
estimates of  human earnings or human capital still leaves an apparent net 
rise in income inequality between mid-18th century (1740-1759 benchmarks) 
and the French War era (1801-1810), whether one sticks with an income 
measure or uses a total-wealth measure (Lindert 1986). 
/ 
[Table 2, Figure 2 about here] 
The other main quantitative data base for judging movements in 
British income inequality before 1914 consists of  series on the mean and 
dispersion of  labor earnings by occupation. Jeffrey Williamson (1985, Ch. 3) has 
Page 12 ambitiously pieced together the average male pay rates, intra-occupational 
earnings distributions, and employment weights for dozens of  occupations for 
benchmark years from the late eighteenth century to the early twentieth.  He 
finds that earnings inequality rose over the first half of  the nineteenth century, 
peaking at the 1851 benchmark.  After an apparent plateau, 1851-1881, earnings 
inequality began to drop, both within and between broad occupational classes. 
On these estimates, the rise and fall of  earnings inequality look more dramatic 
for the economy as a whole than within non-agriculture, since the nonfarm / 
farm ratio of  wage rates for common labor also peaked in 1851.  The rise and 
fall of  earnings within the nineteenth century contrasts with the lack of  trend 
9  for overall income inequality shown in Table 1. 
While the occupational earnings data have thus become abundant for 
Britain in the nineteenth century, their use as a clue to overall income 
inequality trends is compromised by three drawbacks.  The first, of  course, is 
their omission of  property incomes.  Second, the occupations tend to slide 
around the income ranks, denying us a view of  pay ratios between fixed 
percentile positions.  Williamson has documented such rank-switching 
(Williamson 1980; 1985, p. ll),  but it remains a problem.  Third, Jackson (1987) 
and Feinstein (1988) have pointed out defects in some of  the pay series 
Williamson collected and presented, particularly those for the higher-paid 
services.  When the most suspect series are removed, the nineteenth-century 
rise and fall are muted.  It is hard to say there was any rise-fall pattern in pay 
gaps within the nonfarm sector across the nineteenth century.  The revisions 
suggested by Williamson's critics do show a slight rise-and-fall pattern in the 
economy-wide ratio for skilled / unskilled pay from 1827 to 1851 to 1911 
/ 
(Jackson 1987, p. 567; Feinstein 1988, p. 712).  But the economy-wide rise and 
fall in earnings inequality now hinges almost solely on the nonfarm/farm 
ratio, and caveats abound. 
To supplement these traditional inequality measures, we should briefly 
note the likely changes in five other sources of  inequality before 1914: (1) 
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(3) difference in household composition, (4) male/female pay gaps, and (5) 
regional inequalities. 
(1) Real inequality trends differ from nominal inequality trends 
whenever the cost of  living moves differently for rich and for poor.  Cost-of- 
living trends can indeed differ by income class even when everybody faces the 
same prices for individual commodities.  In most settings this point does not 
matter much (e.g. for the United States up to the 1970s, as shown in 
Williamson and Lindert 1980, Ch. 5, and for the UK  since 1978 in Crawford 
1996).  Yet  it matters greatly in our judgment of  English inequality trends in 
the 18th and 19th centuries, as argued elsewhere (Lindert 1998).  In that setting 
the rich spent a much lower share of  their incomes on food than did the poor, 
and the rich also paid out a smaller share of  their income in housing rents. 10 
The relative price of  food rose something like 25 percent 1760-1800, then fell 
back after 1815.  Real housing rents quadrupled between 1760 and 1835, again 
relative to the overall cost-of-living index.  The consumer goods that declined 
in reai price were fuel and textiles-clothing.  Thus the cost of  living rose 
more, or fell less, for the bottom 80 percent of  the income ranks than for the 
top 20 percent or top 5 percent, as sketched in the "real" inequality series of 
Table 1 and Figure 1.  Paying attention to this point re-introduces a noticeable 
rise in inequality, especially between the mid-eighteenth century and the 
early nineteenth. 
(2) Mortality trends could change our perceptions of  inequality trends 
in ways already introduced.  If  one chooses to view deaths in the family as 
deductions from the well-being of  survivors in the same family and same 
income strata, then again hequality may have risen more sharply between 
the mid-eighteenth century and the mid-nineteenth than Table 1 has shown. 
The reason is that the chances of  survival improved markedly for the upper 
classes, to judge from peers' family records, but only slightly for the nation as 
a whole.  On the other hand, if  we follow the inequality of  lifetime 
Page 14 consumption among individuals, then even the modest gains in life 
expectancy between 1688 and 1867 were enough to bring a net equalization. 
Again, as noted, the choice depends on the question asked. 
11 
(3) Adjusting for the changing social gradient of  household 
composition would give an upward tilt to the British inequality trend 
between 1688 and 1867.  So far we have discussed only the distribution of 
household incomes.  A popular alternative is to rank households by their 
income per capita, or per adult-consumption-equivalent, on the ground that 
_larger  household size dilutes consumption standards.  While no such 
adjustment is presented here, we know the direction in which it would 
change the trend between, say, 1688 and 1867.  Over these 179 years, 
household size fell more rapidly among high-income households than 
among low-income households.  In 1688 household size had a slight positive 
correlation with household income, with the richest households including 
servants and with unrelated individuals making up a large share of  the 
pauper host at the bottom of  the ranks.  Thus for 1688 the ratios of  top to 
bottom incomes would be lower on a per-capita basis than on the per- 
household basis shown in Table 1.  Two centuries later the correlation 
between household income and household size was less positive, and 
possibly negative.  For 1867, the ratios of top to bottom incomes might have 
been higher on a per-capita basis than for total household income.  There 
would be more of  a trend toward inequality in income per capita (or per adult 
consumption equivalent) than Table 1 has revealed. 
(4) Our view of  early trends in Britain's male-female income 
differences is still obscured,by the paucity of data on women's wage and salary 
12  rates.  The few quantitative studies available tend to focus on the classic 
1780-1850 era (Horrell and Humphries 1992, 1995; Lindert 1994a; Feinstein 
1996b; and the literature cited there).  For this era, there is a range of 
possibilities.  It seems unlikely that women's real wage rates advanced faster 
than those of  unskilled males and there are hints that they advanced slower 
Page 15 than those male rates, or not at all, across the early nineteenth century.  An 
overall income distribution featuring good data on women's  wages might 
thus show a bit more trend toward inequality between 1780 and 1850 than is 
now evident. 
(5) As for regional income inequalities, British history reveals two 
sharp turning points, though their implications for overall inequality are 
unclear.  Before the late eighteenth century, the poorer regions tended to be in 
Northern England, Wales, and highland Scotland (Schofield 1965, Hunt 1986). 
By  1800, however, poverty had become a feature of  the rural South and West. 
Northern England retained an income advantage over the rest of  Britain (bar 
London) for over a century.  World War I brought the other great turning 
point, and prosperity has been a southeastern specialty ever since.  Famous as 
these two turning points are, they carry no obvious implications for a 
quantitative measure of  national inequality trends. 
B.  When Did American Ineaualitv Rise? 
By  1929, and probably by 1914, income and wealth and earnings were as 
unequally distributed in America as in Britain.  Had it been that way ever 
since Jamestown? 
Lee Soltow has implied as much, consistently doubting any early rise in 
inequality (Soltow 1971, 1984, 1989, 1992).  If  that is true, then the colonists' 
incomes were at least as unequal as the incomes back in Britain.  Such 
inequalities may fit preconceptions about the colonial South, but they clash 
with most preconceptions about the middle or New England colonies.  Were 
past observers wrong in tHinking that migrants to these colonies set up a 
more egalitarian property system, free of  the latifundistos that controlled the 
English and Irish countryside?  A host of  scholars have worked on this issue 
since the 1970s. 
Most evidence fits our usual preconceptions, not Soltow's hypothesis, 
showing a relatively egalitarian America, outside the South, up to at least 
Page 16 1800.  That evidence comes in indirect forms: wealth distributions, suggestive 
wage gaps, mortality trends, and other odds and ends.  There are many studies 
to draw on, but none of  them has the kinds of  income distributions that were 
conjured up by Britains
f
 early social tables and partial income-tax returns, 
since America did not have an income tax that reached below the top one 
percent until this century. 
The best starting point is Alice Hanson Jones's pioneering estimation 
of  the 13-colony distribution of  net worth in 1774 from 939 probate records 
and supporting materials.  Using an elaboration of  estate-multiplier methods, 
Jones developed a distribution of  wealth among the living from the wealth of 
the deceased, with results shown at the top of  Table 3.  While the sample is 
small, no clear defects in her estimates have been revealed. 
To compare colonial inequality with English wealth inequality at 
similar dates, one can roughly equate the top 10 percent of  household heads 
with the top 5 percent of  all adults.  Equating these two shares shows an 
unmistakable contrast between the mother country and Jones's portrait of  the 
13 colonies.  The richest 5 percent of  adults held 85-87 percent of  net worth in 
England and Wales (1740 and 1810 in Table 2) but only 59 percent of  net worth 
in the 13 colonies, even when America's  slaves are counted both as holders of 
13  zero wealth and as other people's property. 
While Jones's study is the only one to pull together estimates over all 
the 13 colonies, it is buttressed and extended by a host of  local studies 
following the distributions of  probated or assessed wealth across a century or 
14  more of  colonial experience.  The flavor of  the local-wealth results is 
shown by Figure 3's  trends from Boston and nearby Hingham, Massachusetts. 
The general trend seems to be upward in most cases, often dramatically so, 
suggesting that wealth might have been held even more equally in the 
seventeenth century than in the eighteenth.  The appearance deceives, 
however.  Most of  the studies follow wealth trends in fixed places, usually 
near the seaboard of  the New England and middle colonies.  The inland 
Page 17 frontier, however, was both more egalitarian and an ever-rising share of  the 
total population.  The westward drift of  people was, in fact, so great that there 
appears to have been no trend at all in  the wealth inequality of  the New 
England and Middle colonies (Williamson and Lindert, 1980 and 1981).  For 
these colonies, wealth inequality back in  the seventeenth century was 
probably not much different from that shown in Alice Hanson Jones's 1774 
benchmark. 
Yet there was one region where wealth inequality probably did rise 
across the colonial era -- the region omitted from most of  the studies of 
colonial wealth trends.  In the South, the share of  slaves in the overall 
population rose from near zero in 1630 to 40 percent in 1770.  So great a rise in 
zero-wealth population, and in people who represented wealth for others, 
must have raised wealth inequality within the South over the century and a 
half ending in the Revolution, even though we lack earlier figures to 
15  compare with Jones's small Southern sample in 1774. 
[Table 3, Figure 3 -- US wealth shares] 
But if  colonial life outside the South was much more egalitarian than 
life in the early twentieth century, we have a nineteenth-century American 
puzzle:  When did the Americans become so unequal?  Did it happen before, 
during, or after the Civil War? 
The wealth-inequality studies imply rising inequality over most 
decades of  the century and a half from Alice Hanson Jones's 1774 benchmark 
. to 1929.  There was no sudden jump in wealth inequality, as far as we can tell. 
/ 
Still, there were episodes.  The most likely short-run troughs in wealth 
inequality came near wars: the 1810s-1820s, the 1860s, and World War I.  All 
other periods of  a decade or longer probably brought rising inequalities. 
16 
Table 3 and Figure 3 sketch the net trend in nineteenth-century wealth 
inequality, using a few relatively reliable benchmark studies.  The main pillar 
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Soltow's pathbreaking (1975) study of census returns on the real and personal 
estates of  males living in 1860 and 1870, plus returnz on real estate alone for 
1850. 
For the period between 1774 and 1860, most local studies show the same 
kind of  rise that Table 3 and Figure 3 imply with their contrast between Alice 
Jones's 1774 and Lee Soltow
Js 1860.  The changes across the Revolutionary and 
early federal years are hard to judge.  One might have expected that top-rank 
shares of  all wealth would have been raised by the confiscation of  large 
properties from Loyalists whose primary resident was outside the colonies, but 
17  we lack good number on this.  Soltow has made a valiant attempt to plot the 
contours of  early federal wealth by sampling 1798 census values of  real estate. 
The data, however, are not up to the standard of  his wealth samples from the 
1850-1870 censuses.  The 1798 census asked people to estimate "dwelling 
houses ... lands, lots, buildings, wharves, owned, possessed, or occupied" with 
no reporting of  holdings under $100 or vacant lots over 2 acres (Soltow 1989, p. 
286 and passim).  The data omit all non-land property and all human earnings. 
They also cast a fog by mixing tenancy with elements of  ownership.  If  the data 
had been gathered only from households in their role as occupants, their 
consumption of  housing could be used to conjecture about the income 
distribution.  That was not done.  On the other hand, the ownership data are 
incomplete, in that the holdings of  the same person in different areas are not 
collated.  Soltow struggled to interpret the ostensible rise in inequality from 
Alice Jones's 1774 to his 1798, saying it was true but probably smaller than he 
himself had estimated (1989, pp. 170-174).  The best resolution seems to be to 
/ 
agree that inequality might have risen a bit between 1774 and 1798, but not as 
much as his 1798 figures imply. 
As a corollary, the widening of  wealth gaps appears to have continued 
beyond 1798 all the way to the Civil War, aside from an 1810s-1820s dip 
suggested by a few local studies.  The ante-bellum widening apparently owed 
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immigration, an urbanization trend, and a continuing frontier settlement.  Yet 
several accounting exercises show no major role for shifts in the age 
distribution, the urban share, or the share foreign born (Williamson and 
Lindert 1981). 
Beyond 1860, the wealth gaps remained wide, aside from temporary 
narrowing during the Civil War decade and during World War I.  In either 
1913 or 1929, American wealth inequality matched that in the United 
Kingdom. 
Still, non-human wealth relates to only part of  the income 
distribution, and one strains to find other indicators of  relative income 
movements across the nineteenth century.  One promising path is to collect 
occupational pay series, to suggest possible movements in the Lorenz curves 
for earnings and for total income, as several scholars have done (Williamson 
and Lindert 1980; Margo and Villaflor 1988; Goldin and Margo 1992a; Margo 
1992).  Jeffrey Williamson and I saw an ante-bellum surge in wage inequality 
between the 1820s and the mid-1850s, a timing that would suggest parallelism 
between wealth-widening and wage-widening.  Margo and his co-authors 
challenged this view by introducing new data on civilian workers hired by 
the army in each of  the major settled regions.  In their data wage widening 
proved elusive between 1821 and 1856.  It showed up for some regions but not 
others, under some summary measures but not others.  This does indeed 
clash with the series used earlier, and casts some doubts on an ante-bellum 
surge in wage inequality.  The doubts serve to repeat the question already 
posed in this section.  If  there was no pronounced widening of  pay gaps before 
the Civil War, when did ipcome inequality, like wealth inequality, reach the 
heights we can document for 1929?  Nothing we know about the colonial 
economy suggests that income should already have been so highly unequal 
outside of the South, given that wealth was not nearly so unequal as it was to 
become in 1929.  If  the income gaps didn't widen between the 1820s and the 
1850s, then when? 
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18  from the larger uncertainties about the income distribution.  We do know 
that the regional inequality in commodity product per capita rose across the 
nineteenth century.  In this case, however, the shift was a single discrete 
event.  The Civil War and emancipation cut Southern incomes relative to 
the rest of  the nation between 1860 and 1880.  The main reason for this 
widening was not wartime destruction, but a change with an unusual welfare 
twist:  Slave emancipation cut black labor supply by 28-37 percent, as they used 
their freedom to reduce the work hours of  children, women, and the elderly 
down to white norms (Ransom and Sutch 1977).  While it may have raised 
the inequality of  conventional incomes across regions, emancipation is a 
change that lacks the welfare cost usually associated with a widening of 
regional income gaps, since people near the bottom of  the income ranks were 
choosing to cut their incomes when given control over their own time.  After 
the 1880 benchmark, anyway, the wide gaps between the non-South and the 
South remained up through 1940. 
The nineteenth-century movement of  male / female wage gaps in the 
United States was quite different from the widening trends that show up for 
the inequality of  wealth and of  regional incomes.  Thanks to Claudia Goldin's 
(1990) pioneering work, we have a better quantitative history of  the gender 
pay gap for America than for Britain.  Goldin finds considerable narrowing of 
the male /female  pay gap (i.e. a rise in women's relative pay) between the 
1820s and the 1850s, further blurring the picture of  this era as one of  rising 
inequality.  After the 1850~~  the trends in the male /female pay-ratio were 
flatter until the late twentieth century. 
/ 
To raise further the stakes in figuring out just when Americans became 
more unequal across the nineteenth century, consider a health-trend puzzle 
that hints at a widening of  gaps in overall life expectancy up to about 1870. 
Several authors have found that stature and life expectancy both shortened 
from about 1790 to about 1870 (Kunze 1979, Fogel 1986, Steckel1995), even 
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laborers and for artisans.  The worsening of  health appears to have happened 
all across the country, north and south, rural and urban.  By  itself, the 
worsening mortality lowered average living standards, in the sense described 
in Part I.  In addition, if  worsening health and earlier death visited the poor 
in particular, as Steckel's work implies (1992, 1995), then we have another 
way in which the inequality of  living standards widened before 1870.  One 
should be cautious about the related belief that the rising inequality of  life 
expectancy shows us a rise in the inequality of  annual incomes.  Other studies 
_cast  doubt on any reliable link between annual-income inequality and the 
level and inequality of  mortality.  The puzzle remains, however:  What 
caused that long gradual worsening --- and the presumably increasing 
inequality -- of  mortality? 
In sum, we know that income inequality must have risen sometime 
between 1774 and any of  these three competing peak-inequality dates:  1860, 
1913, and 1929.  The inequality of  health and life expectancy also worsened 
between 1790 and 1870, and improved thereafter.  Beyond this, the evidence 
on the rise of  unequal America is only suggestive and incomplete. 
111.  WHEN INCOMES LEVELED 
The early twentieth century brought three related changes to Britain, to 
the United States, and to other high-income countries:  (1) Governments 
redistributed more, (2) governments collected and published more income 
data, and (3) incomes becape more equal even "before" taxes.  Let us follow 
the third of  these developments, carefully using the second and wondering 
about the role of  the first.  While the role of  redistribution is automatically 
reduced by our following the convention of looking at the distribution "pre- 
fisc" income, it is still a significant force in shaping that distribution. 
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these two countries.  Let us turn first to Britain, whose leveling era lasted 
longer and achieved more. 
A.  Britain. 
When did the leveling of  British incomes start?  There is strong reason 
to wonder, and there are some shaky data to satisfy our curiosity on events 
before 1938.  We wonder primarily because we seek to know whether the 
leveling of  market incomes antedated the confiscation of  top property 
holdings by progressive taxation.  Taken at face value, the rough estimates 
shown in Table 1 and Figure 1 say that the equalization of  fixed incomes did 
indeed antedate Lloyd George, since inequality was less pronounced in the 
revised-Bowley estimates for 1911 than for the revised-Baxter estimates for 
1867.  Intriguing as this possibility is, it cannot be considered a "finding" until 
far better data are available for the late nineteenth century and early 
twentieth. 
Starting in 1938, and continuing through 1974, the Central Statistical 
Office produced its Survey of  Personal Incomes (SPI) estimates of  the 
distribution of  before-tax income among tax units.  From 1949 through 
1984/5, it offered the alternative "Blue Book" series drawing on results of  the 
Family Expenditure Survey, still sticking with the tax unit as the population 
base.  Then, with data running from 1977, the CSO (now the Office of 
National Statistics) transformed the population unit to the consumption- 
equivalised household.  This current series, however, presents shares only for 
quintiles, hiding our view'of  movements within each quintile.  Subject to the 
much-discussed limitations of  the various series (Royal Commission 1977, 
Chs. 2, 3, 5;  Atkinson and Micklewright 1992; Atkinson 1995, Ch. I), Figure 4 
and Table 1 present Gini's and top-quantile shares to summarize the history 
they offer. 
Page 23 [Figure 4 about here -- 20th-century UK income shares] 
The gap between top-income groups and other Britons continued to 
narrow across the first three quarters of  the twentieth century.  There were 
important limitations to this movement, however.  The top 5 percent 
definitely lost greatly in their income share, but there the leveling may have 
stopped.  The very next group, the 80-95% group, did not suffer any erosion of 
income relative to those below them.  Table 1's SPI estimates for taxpayer 
units imply that the average pre-fisc income of  the 80-95% group kept the 
same ratio to that of  the bottom 80 percent of  taxpayers all the way through to 
the end of  the leveling era around 1974: 
Year 
1867 
191  1 (SPI) 
1938 (  " ) 
1949 (  'I ) 
1964(  ") 
m(  ") 
1975 (Blue Book) 
1984 (Blue Book) 






2.08  - 
2.39 
2.76 
This contrasts with the reverse movement from 1975 one, when the 80-95% 
group definitely shared in the top-rank gains.  Furthermore, as far as we can 
tell from the especially poor figures on income in the bottom income ranks, 
the bottom forty percent did not gain relative to the middle quintile after 1938 
(no guesses should be ventured about movements below the median between 
the 1911 and 1938 benchmarks).  Britain's leveling in pre-fisc income, then, 
may have conformed to a simple formula:  The top 5 percent lost ground, and 
(at least after 1938) the gaining ranks were the next 55 percent, not the bottom 
40 percent. 
Page 24 Trends in the inequality of  disposable income, after taxes and transfers, 
probably had similar turning points, but with a greater net change and a 
different locus of equalization between income ranks.  Fiscal redistribution 
brought more equalization after World War I1 than any time before.  The 
fiscal redistribution, unlike the trends in pre-fisc inequality, clearly raised the 
share received by the bottom forty percent of  hoilseholds. 
The same three-quarters of  a century saw a drop in the concentration of 
personal wealth into the hands of  the top 5 percent of  adults, as Table 2 and 
Figure 2 have shown.  To be more precise, that dramatic decline in wealth 
concentration came between the 1911/13 benchmark and about 1980 -- and 
then stopped.  While the wealth figures require, and have received, very 
careful handling (Atkinson and Harrison 1978; Economic Trends, November 
1991, Feinstein 1996a), the existence of  a decline can withstand even large 
errors in the estimates. 
Britain's pay ratios, too, have shown some compression since the start 
of  the twentieth century (Routh 1965, Lydall 1968, Phelps Brown 1977).  On 
many, but not all, measures World War I1 stands out as a watershed of  pay 
compression.  Despite the usual caveat about the trickiness of  the link 
between pay ratios and inter-quantile earnings (or income) ratios, the 
twentieth-century pay data are rich enough -- and the pattern of  compression 
consistent enough across broad occupational groups -- to establish that there 
was a net change, at least over the whole sweep of 75 years.  So both wealth 
inequality and pay ratios (and presumably labor-earnings inequality) moved 
in harmony with the overall pre-fisc income distribution. 
Probably very little of  Britain's twentieth-century leveling took the 
/ 
form of  a drop in regional inequality.  There was, to be sure, that historic shift 
of  relative prosperity from northern England to the southeast, particularly to 
the home counties, across World War I.  This may not have implied a great 
reduction in income inequality, however.  Rather, the regional inequalities 
seem to have moved only in sympathy with the aggregate unemployment 
rate.  Given that Britain's unemployment has been highly regionalized in this 
Page 25 century, a period of  high unemployment tends to become a period of  high 
regional inequality.  Thus World War 11  brought a lasting drop in Britain's 
regional income inequalities (Williamson 1965, p. 25), and the rising 
unemployment since the late 1970s has raised them. 
Like nineteenth-century  America, twentieth-century Britain poses a 
puzzle about trends in unequal mortality.  The British mortality puzzle is 
this:  Why, over three-quarters of  a century of  income leveling, didn't 
mortality, even infant mortality, become more equal across the five main 
socio-occupational classes?  In fact, the opposite happened, to judge from 
standardized mortality measures:  Of  the five census occupational classes, the 
highest (professional and managerial) had the greatest improvement in life 
expectancy, and the lowest (manual labor) had the least from the start of  the 
century to the 1970s (Titmuss 1943; I-Iollingsworth 1979; Preston, Haines and 
Pamuk 1981; Townsend et al. 1988; Hollingsworth et al. 1990; Lee 1991; 
Wilkinson 1996, Chs. 3-5). 
There are ways to discount the puzzle, but it resists vanishing.  Mere 
shifts in group sizes and inclusiveness do not seem to explain the puzzle, 
though there could have been some selectivity effect related to the rise in the 
top-class group's share of  the population and the decline in the bottom 
group's share.  It is also true that the absolute mortality rates, per 1,000 per 
year, have converged, even though the inter-class ratios among them have 
diverged.  Finally, one can switch to a focus on the inequality of  lifetime 
consumption among individuals, as described in Part I of  this chapter.  Doing 
so makes the trend in life-expectancy egalitarian, simply by reducing absolute 
infant mortality. 
Nonetheless,  the puzzle remains:  Why didn't  the inter-class mortality 
ratios also decline?  While the debate continues, we need only to grant that 
something in twentieth-century health experience did not conform to 
movements in income inequality as one might have expected. 
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For the United States, the shift to more equal pre-fisc incomes lasted 
only a quarter century, from 1929 to 1953, the year when Burns read Kuznets's 
book.  Over that quarter century, it kept pace with the changes in Britain's pre- 
fisc inequality.  Then it stopped altogether.  Thus over the entire sweep from 
1867 to 1974 Britain's  leveling was greater.  Britons were less equal than 
Americans around the 1870s.  A century later the two countries' inequalities 
may have been similar before taxes and transfers, but the disposable incomes 
people could consume or save were probably less unequal in Britain. 
The American change was nonetheless pronounced.  Table 4 and Figure 
5 plot what we know about American income inequality since the income tax 
was introduced in 1913.  The fuller Lorenz curves show that the decline at the 
top was shared by the whole top 20 percent, and there is no clear shift of 
relative incomes within the remaining 80 percent.  America's  wide lower 
income gaps -- for example, between the middle quintile and the bottom -- 
have stood out in international perspective throughout this century. 
[Table 4, Figure 5 about here -- U.S. income shares] 
The income leveling of  1929-1953 was not a statistical lie, even though 
the main data set comes from income tax returns.  To explain away the 
apparent decline in the top income shares, the pattern of  hiding or mis- 
reporting income would have had to have twisted implausibly, and 
.  production-based data confirm that the aggregate underreporting of  income is 
not peculiar to interest and profit incomes (Williamson and Lindert 1980, pp. 
86-88).  Less direct confirmation of  the change can be seen in shifts in 
America's occupations and living arrangements, particularly across the 1940s. 
Domestic servants, barbers, and beauticians declined as a share of  the labor 
force, probably because higher-income customers found them less affordable 
(Stigler 1956).  Boarding and lodging stopped being a common practice, and 
Page 27 people moved to their own homes with fewer persons per housing unit. 
While some of these changes were responses to the absolute growth of 
average incomes, the equalization of  incomes probably brought more people 
over those occupational or home-ownership thresholds. 
As with Britain, the compression in America's  income distribution was 
paralleled by compression in its wealth distribution.  For the same era studied 
by Kuznets, Robert Lampman (1962) found a reduction in top wealth shares. 
Since then both the estimates for those years and the experience of  more 
recent years have changed.  Edward Wolff  and Marcia Marley (1989) have 
adjusted the estimates, and have presented variants with and without a 
valuation of  pension entitlements.  As shown in Table 3, the net wealth 
leveling from the 1929 peak to the 1950s still stands.  Since the 1950s, there 
have been further gyrations in the top wealth share, with a trough in the late 
1970s and a rise across the 1980s. 
Another parallelism is that U.S. occupational pay ratios and earnings 
inequality also declined between 1929 and 1953, mainly across World War I1 
(Ober 1948, Phelps Brown 1977, Williamson and Lindert 1980, Goldin and 
Margo 1992b). While skilled / unskilled pay ratios, the main form of 
evidence here, are subject to the same caveats mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, their behavior over the leveling era is clear enough to withstand 
some roughness on the income positions each occupational average wage 
defines.  The drop in those ratios also guides our search for underlying causes 
of  the change in income inequality:  Any explanation should incorporate 
changes in the market returns to different kinds of  labor. 
The parallelism also extends to America's  inequalities among regions 
and between races, and pevhaps to the gender gap in wage rates, though these 
three conformities are not equally close.  Regional inequalities shrank across 
the 1940s in particular, coinciding with at least part of  the equalization of 
incomes nationwide (Smolensky 1963, Williamson 1965, Amos 1989, Fan and 
Cassetti 1994).  So did the gap between white and black average incomes, 
though this particular egalitarian trend continued at least through 1975 
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The male-female pay gap may also have improved sometime between 1930 
and 1970, though the change looks small, especially in comparison with what 
followed in the 1980s (Goldin 1990). 
IV.  RISING INEQUALITY SINCE THE 1970s. 
The main creative contribution of  the last two decades to the study of 
inequality trends has been to serve notice that we should spend at least as 
much time asking why there are episodic reversals between decades as we 
have spent on thelong-run sweep across the centuries.  If  the Kuznets curve 
meant graduation from Marxian-classical linearity to a quadratic trend, then 
one should hope that the British and American experience of  the last two 
decades leads modelers to take more than just the next step.  Instead of  just 
predicting a long-run cubic inequality curve, they should invest in an eclectic 
approach that finds different causes for movements in different epochs, as 
Atkinson (1997) has stressed.  The obsolescence of  the Kuznets curve, in any 
case, stands out clearly enough in these two countries' recent experience. 
A.  Britain. 
Britain's era of  gradual leveling reversed around 1977, according to the 
various income and earnings series reported in Table 1 and Figure 4.  Since 
1977 the top quintile of  households gained at the expense of  the bottom 40 
/ 
percent.  The turning point and the new trend are robust to choices of 
inequality measure, and are also not the result of  shifts in age, household 
composition, fiscal policy, or industrial structure.  By  most measures, Britain's 
inequality rise was as great as that experienced by any industrialized country 
after 1977.  l9 
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household income (Atkinson and Micklewright 1992; Katz, Blanchflower, 
and Loveman 1993).  The top-wealthholder shares of  all wealth, however, did 
not widen until an upturn from 1984 to 1991/2 (Table 2 and Banks et al. 1996). 
There were important cross-currents related to gender.  As far as rates 
of pay were concerned, women experienced a slight fall-back between 1978 
and 1985, though it was not serious enough to erase their relative progress 
from 1973 to 1978 (Blau and Kahn 1993, p. 106).  On the other hand, the rise in 
married women's rates of  participation and work hours was so great that it 
-played a key role in restraining the overall widening in household income 
gaps shown by those income estimates in Table 1 and Figure 4 (Borooah et al. 
1995,1996; Harkness et al. 1996). 
B. America. 
America's gaps in household income, already wide by international 
standards, have also been widening.  The turning point came sometime 
between 1974 and 1980, depending on the specific measure chosen.  As a 
general rule, it is the top 5 percent of  households that have gained, and the 
20  bottom 60 percent that have lost, in relative shares.  Even within that 
favored top 5 percent, the biggest gains may have come at the very top. 
Studies of  the compensation given to corporate Chief Executive Officers show 
that America's CEOs have extended their already substantial lead, both 
relative to CEOs in other industrialized countries and relative to US 
production workers (Crystal 1993; Abowd and Bognanno 1995).  Measures of 
inequality in individual e&nings, as distinct from household income, show 
that the widening extended all the way down the spectrum.  Thus, for 
example, the pay ratio of  the 90th percentile to the median and the ratio of  the 
median to the 10th percentile both widened, both among men and among 
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1995; Karoly and Burtless 1995 ).  Wealth inequality also jumped after 1980. 
In fact, the rise in American inequality since the early postwar years 
may have advanced further, and may have started earlier, than implied by 
the top-group income shares and Gini's of  Table 4 and Figure 5.  There is 
mounting evidence that the official figures shown there underestimate the 
incomes of  the top 3-5 percent of  households. 
The official U.S. Census figures miss two key developments in the top 
tail of  the income distribution.  First, they omit capital gains and stock 
options, which became a large share of  top incomes in the 1990s.  Second, they 
are subject to a serious "top coding" problem.  As others have begun to point 
out (U.S. Congress 1992, 1993; Ryscavage 1995; Mishel et al. 1997, pp. 417-421), 
the Census estimates value all household incomes in the top class at the floor 
of  that top class.  That floor was only $50,000 for 1967-1976, then $100,000 for 
1977-1984, $300,000 for 1985-1992, and $1 million since 1993.  The official CPS 
estimates imply that between 1980 and 1997 Bill Gates of  Microsoft earned less 
than $8 million -- from which he somehow accumulated a personal net 
worth valued over $36 billion in 1997 (Newsweek, Aug. 4,1997,49-50).  Worse 
yet, the published official CPS figures display even lower top-class cutoffs, 
frustrating any attempt to view what has happened within the top 5 percent 
of  households. 
Better clues about the true postwar movements in U.S. income 
inequality are afforded by abandoning the top-income shares and Gini's in 
favor of  inter-quantile income ratios that only dare measure incomes up to 
. the 95th percentile, just below that top-5-percent darkness. Table 5 and Figure 
6 do so, showing a quite different view of  the net change in inequality since 
1929. At face value, it appears that households at the 95th- and 80th-percentile 
positions in 1995 could be as far above the median household, in ratio terms, 
as their counterparts back in 1929, thus erasing all the leveling of  the 1929- 
1953 era.  While changes in the basis of  measurement pose dangers for such 
long-run comparisons, there is a case for re-examining the whole basis of  the 
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21  equalization has now been reversed. 
[Table 5 and Figure 6 about here.] 
The overall rise of  inequality since the 1970s has cast different moving 
shadows when viewed from a regional, racial, or gender standpoint.  Among 
regions, it took the form of  a 1978-1988 reversal in the continuing 
convergence of  regional incomes-per-capita in the United States.  After that 
decade of  widening, some narrowing of  regional gaps resumed (Amos 1989, 
Fan and Cassetti 1994, Husted 1991; Ram 1992; Nissan and Carter 1993; 
Sherwood-Call 1996).  On the racial front, the relative income position of 
blacks failed to make progress after 1975, especially for black males, though it 
did not retreat on the average (Oliver and Shapiro 1995; Donoghue and 
Heckman 1991, Freeman and Bound 1992). 
America's gender pay gap has been particularly wide because the whole 
pay structure is more spread out in America.  That is, gender pay gaps tend to 
be correlated with overall occupational gaps across industrialized countries, 
the main exception being the high relative pay for Australian women.  Still, 
the 1980s and early 1990s brought a peculiar cross-current.  American women 
swam upstream against the general rise in inequality, posting their best 
relative gains in pay per hour of any decade since the mid-nineteenth century 
(Goldin 1990; O'Niell and Polachek 1993; Blau and Kahn 1995 pp. 106-7; 
Blackburn and Bloom 1987; Cancian et al. 1993).  This dramatic improvement 
a in women's  relative position came later than in other countries, and appears 
to have owed much to thd rise of  anti-discrimination enforcement across the 
1980s. 
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Economists' attempts to explain such movements in income inequality 
generally pass the data through a group-decomposition filter, and then settle 
on choices of  more exogenous underlying causes.  The decomposition phase 
is of  great value in channeling the search for underlying causes, because it 
multiplies the number of  separate movements -- changes in between-group 
inequalities, versus changes in within-group inequalities, versus inequality 
changes due to shifts in  group weights -- that any underlying theory must 
explain.  When the decompositions are done, however, six kinds of  causal 
forces usually are chosen for the task of  explanation: 
(1) population growth (demographic transition, migration); 
(2) the rate of  skills growth per member of  the labor force; 
(3) biases in technological change; 
(4) product-demand shifts (either domestic or global); 
(5) labor-market institutions, including unions; and 
(6) government fiscal redistribution. 
The first four forces have been featured in most explanations of 
America's inequality movements.  They have been emphasized over labor- 
market institutions and government redistribution, for the most part, because 
these fifth and sixth categories were smaller shares of  American economic 
life, especially before 1933. 
For example, Williamson and Lindert (1980) featured the first three 
forces in their interpretatkn of  movements in U.S. earnings gaps from 1839 
through 1973.  The rates of  population growth and skills growth were 
negatively correlated and worked in combination.  In particular, one reason 
why the leveling came in the period 1929- 1948 was the combination of  slower 
population growth and faster skills growth.  Conversely, across the 
nineteenth century population grew faster, skills per worker grew slower, and 
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implications of  technological (or total-factor-productivity) change played an 
22  important complementary role in explaining trend reversals in pay ratios. 
The recent debate on the causes of  the wage widening in Britain and 
America since the 1970s is another case study, one that has featured demand 
and supply forces equivalent to (1) - (5) above.  The competing views differ in 
the relative roles to be assigned to (a) immigration (a part of  (1)  above), (b) 
slowdown in skills growth, (c) labor-saving technological bias, (d) shifts in 
domestic product demand (part of  (4) above), (e) increasing import 
competition and out-sourcing of  supply sectors (also a part of  (4) above), 
versus (f) the decline of  labor-union power ((5) above). 
On the heavily-studied American experience since the 1970s, there 
seems to be an emerging consensus that the international parts of  the story -- 
immigration, out-sourcing, and trade competition -- will explain part, but less 
than half, of  the observed widening.  Biased technological progress and the 
deceleration of  skills growth across the 1980s combine to explain a large part 
23  of  the recent widening.  Labor-market institutions, our force (5) above, do 
play a role in twentieth-century income movements, even in the United 
States.  Several writings by Richard Freeman (e.g. 1980, 1993) have shown that 
unionization trends shaped both the U.S. wage compression of  1929-1953 and 
the more recent U.S. wage widening.  Blau and Kahn (1996) confirm that de- 
unionization and decentralized wage bargaining account for most of  the 
peculiarity of  the American income distribution relative to Europe. 
The sixth force, government fiscal redistribution as an influence on 
.  the inequality of  pre-fisc incomes, remains a singular challenge.  It is always 
hard to trace effects of  tax-transfer progressivity or regressivity back onto the 
pre-fisc distribution.  We can test the premise, however, that the movements 
in pre-fisc inequality (equalization) seemed to follow trends toward 
regressivity (progressivity) of  the fiscal structure.  Crude tests of  this sort can 
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countries'  return to greater inequalities thereafter. 
Could all of  Britain's income leveling up to tl~e  1970s have been the 
24  result of  government fiscal redistribution?  That is possible, even though 
we are following measures of  pre-fisc income here.  Perhaps government 
took such a large confiscatory tax bite from the richest in society, year after 
year, as to reduce their share of  non-human wealth and therefore of  property 
income, bringing about the overall leveling we observe. 
There are at least three reasons why fiscal redistribution probably does 
not explain all of  the observed leveling of  Britain's pre-fisc incomes since the 
late nineteenth or early twentieth century: 
(a) The compression of  occupational pay ratios could not have come 
from fiscal redistribution as such, and it was large enough that it must have 
accounted for a noticeable share of  the income leveling. 
(b) The income leveling occurred in many countries, some with more 
progressivity than Britain and some with less (Lydall 1968, Lindert and 
Williamson 1985, Phelps Brown 1988). 
(c) The historic decline in the income share of  the top 5 percent seems 
to have started before the tax-transfer system took a particularly large bite 
from that top 5 percent.  The early estimates by Lord Samuel (1919) imply that 
the top 5% paid only something like 10 percent average tax on unearned 
income in 1903/4 and only 5-7 percent on earned income, versus 5-9 percent 
for everybody else in the taxpaying ranks.  By  1913/4 Lloyd George and others 
had raised the top-5-percent tax bite to 15 percent on unearned income and 7-8 
'percent on earned income,,versus 5-7 percent on all other taxpayers.  These 
differences would not seem large enough to have caused the declines in the 
top 5 -percent share we observe.  Granted, Barna (1945) has estimated that by 
1937 the average tax take from the top 5 percent had risen greatly, to numbers 
like 40-60%'  versus 20 percent for all other taxpayers.  The CSO estimates for 
1953 say something similar.  These 1937 and 1953 snapshots do indeed imply a 
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further study of  interwar tax incidence confirms that the progressivity did not 
single out the top 5 percent much until the 1930s, the point will remain that 
much of  the leveling had taken place before the linkage from differential tax 
rates to differential property accumulation could have taken effect. 
Could Britain's  widening pre-fisc inequalities since the 1970s have been 
the result of  a prior regressive shift toward lighter taxation of  the top income 
ranks?  The recent history is difficult to read.  There was indeed a long 
uneven decline in the progressivity of  tax-transfer effects from 1949 to 1980, to 
judge from the usual kind of  incidence calculations published in Economic 
Trends.  One might imagine that this set the stage for the reversion toward 
higher property-income growth in the top ranks since the 1970s.  Yet from 
1980 to 1984, over the first half of  the Thatcher government, the figures show 
a pronounced rise in progressive redistribution through government, placing 
the mid-Thatcher years alongside the Attlee years as the most progressive 
spells of  the whole postwar era.  The underlying reason, of  course, is that the 
early-1980s return to progressivity was unintentional:  Unemployment soared 
so much that fixed entitlement formulas raised the transfers toward the poor. 
It is only after 1984 that one sees a simultaneous combination of  increasing 
regressivity and increasing pre-fisc inequality (Atkinson 1996, 1997).  If  there is 
a longer-run feedback from regressivity to pre-fisc inequality in recent 
25  decades, only a more detailed calculation can quantify it. 
The 1980s US  income widening might have been slightly augmented 
by a retreat from progressivity.  While we again lack a detailed tracing of  the 
feedback from regressivity trends to subsequent pre-fisc inequality, studies of 
the determinants of  post-fi'sc  inequality do show that regressivity and pre-fisc 
inequality marched together in America since the late 1970s.  Gramlich, 
Kasten, and Sammartino (1993, pp. 233-243) find that of  the 6.8 percentage 
point rise in the post-fisc Gini for US family incomes between 1980 and 1990, a 
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progressivity accounted for the remaining 1.8 points. 
Thus in three cases -- Britain's pre-fisc leveling, plus the widening of 
pre-fisc inequalities in both countries since the 1970s -- the trends in fiscal 
progressivity (regressivity) were more or less followed by trends toward pre- 
fisc income leveling (widening).  The timing is imperfect, however, and the 
underlying link awaits more detailed studies covering decades of  data. 
VI. LESSONS ABOUT LONG-RUN CHANGES. 
In addition to spotlighting the six forces that shape most of  the episodic 
swings in income inequality, the accumulated history of  British and America 
also offers generalizations that span the sweep of  the last three centuries. 
These generalizations yield predictions about the future experiences of  the 
world's least developed countries.  They also light the way to the next phase 
of  research on what drives inequality in the long run. 
A.  The Kuznets Curve as a Milkv Wav. 
First, it is evident that the Kuznets curve flickers.  It cannot steadily 
illuminate all inequality history, any more than the Phillips Curve reliably 
links unemployment to wage-price inflation.  Best seen dimly in the distance 
without the distraction of  competing light sources, the Kuznets Curve is still 
.  visible as a convenient tendency related to the development process.  It blurs 
/ 
into the background where Kuznets admitted he had the greatest doubts, 
namely in the early-modem settings where he thought inequality might have 
risen.  As noted earlier, that is as we should have expected, since countries 
begin sustained development from radically different initial distributions, 
especially land distributions.  The downslope of  the inverted U stands out 
more clearly and predictably.  So does the end of  the downslope. 
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A final pattern that emerges over the centuries points toward a 
different path for future research on the determinants of  inequality trends. 
The pattern is this: Across time and across jurisdictions, redistribution 
toward the poor is least achieved where it is most warranted by the usual 
principles of  welfare policy, such as cushioning the lowest absolute incomes 
most, redressing inequalities where they are the greatest, and encouraging 
-labor-force re-entry. Elsewhere I have called this the Robin-Hood Paradox, 
since the paradox suggests that Robin Hood's redistributive army is missing 
when and where it is most needed (Lindert 1991, pp. 226-231).  There is an 
immediate corollary for trends in redistribution and inequality:  A rise in pre- 
fisc inequality will be accompanied by a shift toward fiscal regressivity, and an 
era of  leveling will be an era of  increasing fiscal progressivity. 
The earlier and poorer the setting, and the greater the inequality, the 
stronger the case for- taxing property to aid the poor.  With a large share of  the 
population near subsistence and in poor health, there is a good chance that 
giving aid will raise labor supply:  The aid can improve workers' health and 
survival enough to outweigh any incentive to take more subsidized leisure. 
27  Yet the earlier and poorer the setting, the less that support was given.  With 
the advance of  average incomes, and especially in  the eras when pre-fisc 
inequality was also being reduced, aid to the poor became more generous.  As 
we have seen, recent experience hints that the correlation might even hold 
when the trend is away from, not toward, pre-fisc equality.  That appears to be 
the case in the United Stafes, though in Britain the temporal correlation was 
weakened by the temporary rise of  redistributive spending from 1979 to 1984. 
Over space, the paradox also holds more often than not.  Certainly in 
today's global international cross-section, progressive redistribution toward 
the poor correlates strongly with both average incomes and pre-fisc equality of 
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twentieth-century America, particularly before the late 1960s, the poor have 
received more aid, even as a share of  average incomes, in those states where 
poverty has been less severe.  There are spatial exceptions to the paradox, 
28  however. 
How could pre-fisc inequality be correlated with a regressivity in taxes 
and transfers?  Here we are triply challenged.  First, there is that difficult task 
of  quantifying the feedback from the tax-transfer system to the pre-fisc Lorenz 
curve.  A second challenge added here is to determine how pre-fisc inequality 
in turn affects society's willingness to redistribute between income ranks. 
Having received hints about a simultaneous relationship between 
redistribution and pre-fisc inequality, we must solve the problem of 
estimating them simultaneously.  Correct appreciation of  the influence of 
fiscal redistribution on pre-fisc inequality waits upon the simultaneous 
identification of  the determinants of  the redistribution itself. 
Before sending the task off  to the econometric laboratory, however, one 
should formulate a strategy for dealing with a third research challenge, one 
related to political voice.  Our usual hunches about the effect of  income 
distribution on redistributive policies are in danger of  colliding with the 
overall empirical pattern summarized by the Robin Hood paradox.  The 
quickest way to see the third research challenge is to think of  an unequal and 
underdeveloped society, like Britain before the 1830s or a Latin American 
country today.  In such societies, incomes and socio-economic mobility are 
highly skewed.  There is a wealthy elite far above the rest of  the ranks, and the 
mean income far exceeds @e median.  Our usual theoretical priors are that 
such a skewed society is ripe for taxing the rich, with the median voter 
preferring a high rate of  progressive taxation. So say most recent models of 
the redistributive process (e.g. Peltzman 1980, Meltzer and Richard 1981, 
Kristov et al. 1992, Alesina and Rodrik 1994, Persson and Tabellini 1994).  If  so, 
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skewed societies yielding the least redistribution from rich to poor? 
The answer must lie in the relationship of thc income distribution to 
political voice.  In fact, highly skewed societies are ones in which the wealthy 
elite retains a high share of  political power as well as of  wealth and income. 
The usual pressure-group models, such as median-voter models, should not 
be applied until they are cast in terms of  the self-interests of  those who 
actually have political voice.  In the highly skewed societies, the median voter 
is often someone up in the top quintile of  the income ranks.  Thus, for 
Britain, the task is to re-examine how the self-interests of  well-to-do swing 
voters were transformed by the Reform Acts of  1832, 1867,1883-4, and beyond. 
For the task of  understanding what is so different about America, it is 
essential to incorporate the peculiarly low rate of  political participation of 
America's  poor. 
Here, surely, is a key to resolving the mysteries of  how redistribution 
though government relates to overall inequality.  Only when we have a 
tested working theory of  the three-way relationship between income 
inequality, inequality of  political voice, and redistribution through 
government, will we have a clear view of  any of  these three sides to the 
29  inequality issue. 
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For a review of  alternative concepts of  the standard of  living, with 
some discussion of  inequality movements, see Steckel (1994).  There is a large 
literature on the economic valuation of  gains in life expectancy (e.g. Usher 
1973, Williamson 1984), but without quantification of  its impact on the 
inequality of  living standards, a task left to Jackson (1994). 
To emphasize that either view to the inequality of  life expectancy 
seems valid, depending on the question being pursued, I should note that I 
have viewed it both ways.  In (Lindert 1991, p. 214) I suggested a focus on 
individual lifetime consumption patterns, so that, for example, infant deaths 
in any social class would raise the inequality of  living standards among 
individuals.  This view is developed and quantified in Jackson (1994).  A 
comment on Britain on the same page, and in (Lindert 1994), I reverted to the 
implicit convention of  viewing infant mortality as a subtraction from the 
well-being of  households in the affected ranks of  the income distribution. 
See, in particular, Soltow (1968,1969,1971,1975,1984,1989,1990, 
1992); Williamson and Lindert (1980); Lindert and Williamson (1983, 1985); 
Williamson (1985, 1991); Lindert (1986, 1991, 1994); criticisms of  Williamson 
(1985) by Jackson (1987) and Feinstein (1988); criticisms of  Lindert (1991) by 
Jackson (1994); Phelps Brown (1988); and van Zanden (1994). 
The choice of  population units is driven by data availability.  In this 
. case it is expedient to compare estimates for households.  The early social 
/ 
tables sometimes called them "families" but apparently included servants in 
wealthy households and unrelated adult individuals at the bottom of  the 
distribution.  The rest of  this chapter alternates between households, earners, 
and adults, depending on which units are offered in the available series. 
5 This view of  rent/wage trends rests on a miscellany of  sources.  The 
wage series are the Phelps Brown - Hopkins wage for building laborers and 
Page 41 John's (1989) farm wage rates.  The rents are those reported in John (1989), in 
my gleanings of  several rent series in (Lindert 1983 working paper), and in an 
updated version of  Gregory Clark's (1991) rack-rent series.  Clark's current 
estimates of  the rental/wage ratio in English agriculture show a large 
sustained rise from 1740 all the way to 1840. 
Another crude hint also points to the era ending in the French Wars as 
the top candidate for rising inequality in Britain.  Between 1780 and 1801 the 
current-consensus estimates of  national product per employed person grew 
substantially, whereas the real wages received by broad groups of  workers 
stagnated or even declined (Feinstein 1996b, and the sources cited there). 
Growth rates between the 1801 and 1831 benchmarks again suggest faster 
growth in average national product than in real wages, though the hint looks 
stronger for 1780-1801 than for 1801-1831. 
The wealth distributions for England and Wales 1670-1875 are 
detailed and interpreted in Lindert (1985, 1986, 1987).  The financial and social 
position of  the very top wealth-holders was described at length by Rubinstein 
(1981, 1986). See also Soltow (1990) on Scottish landed wealth in the 
eighteenth century. 
Future research could narrow the wide confidence intervals on wealth 
inequality for the mid-nineteenth century reported in Lindert (1986), by using 
the death duty returns in the Public Record Office, which were unavailable at 
the time of  my research.  These returns attach real estate to personal estate 
more closely than I could do by collating materials from separate sources. 
Though he refused to make a will, "Karl Marx, Gentleman, a 
Widower" left almost £300 in personal estate in 1883, according to the 
Principal Probate Registry.  Frederick Engels, again a "Gentleman," left £25,265 
a dozen years later.  Other personal-estate probate entries (excluding real 
estate in each case) include £31,821 for Sir Isaac Newton in 1727, almost 
£10,000 for Sir Frederick Morton Eden in 1810, almost £300,000 for David 
Page 42 Ricardo in 1823, and £129,542 for Charles Dickens in 1870 (Public Record 
Office,  PROB3/26/66 and IR59). 
~elktive  to other countries, mid-Victorian Britain (1867-1875) stood 
out as a nation of  extreme inequality in landownership, personal net worth, 
and pre-tax incomes (Lindert 1987).  We lack sufficient data to say definitively, 
however, whether Britain occupied the absolute top inequality position 
among major nations at the time. 
While carefully noting that earnings inequality and overall income 
inequality need not follow the same trends, Williamson felt that they just 
happened to rise and fall together in nineteenth-century Britain.  This 
coincidence no longer holds, however, now that the present Table 1 (like 
Feinstein 1988, Jackson 1994, and Lindert 1994a) has adjusted the key 1867 
income distributions to a household basis more comparable with earlier and 
later income distributions. 
An earlier movement noted by Williamson (1985, pp. 47-49) also differs 
from a trend in overall income inequality implied by the social tables.  He 
found that pay gaps narrowed from 1781 to 1805, before rising again.  The 
narrowing of  employee pay rates during the French Wars is a plausible 
counter-current in the presumably turbulent income movements of  that era. 
Sudden wartime inflations often compress the pay ratio between higher- and 
lower-paid employee groups, because higher salaries tend to advance more 
steadily, less cyclically, than the wage rates of  lower-paid groups. 
The unusual compression of  employee pay gaps around 1805 is 
a  consistent with the conclusion that overall inequality had widened 
considerably (that rise from 1759 to 1801/03 in Table 1).  Those in the skilled 
manual trades and lower-paid professions, whose nominal pay failed to keep 
pace during the wartime inflation, were probably dropping down the quantile 
ranks as well, while farmers, yeomen, and farm laborers were probably rising. 
Even tenant farmers and yeomen on long-term leases must have shared 
some of the wartime jump in the residuals generated by farming.  (The 
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force, also peaked briefly in the French War era, on the eve of  the weavers' 
infamous demise). 
My overall impression of  the changes from the mid-eighteenth century 
to the French War era is that top groups gained relatively to all others, while 
many occupations reshuffled their relative positions in the lower income 
ranks.  The identity of  the fastest-gaining top groups is an uncertain mix of 
landed aristocracy and top merchants.  The top-end gainers in the income 
distribution were the top 5 percent of  households (Table I), but the top 1 
percent did not gain in income share, unlike the gain shown for the top 1 
percent in the wealth distribution (Table 2).  For much richer detail on the 
social and occupational identities of  the richest individuals, see Rubinstein 
(1981,1986). 
lo A technical point of  considerable importance here is that much of 
the top income households'  housing was owner-occupied.  The available data 
apparently do not impute income from owner-occupied housing as part of 
nominal income.  Accordingly, it should also not be counted as part of  the 
consumer bundle purchased by home-owning households.  Thus, rent was a 
lower share of  household income for the rich than for the poor, and the rapid 
rise in rents hurt lower-income purchasing power more than the purchasing 
power of  the rich.  This difference in housing weights and the difference in 
food weights explain why real inequality probably rose more between 1759 
and 1801/03 than did nominal inequality.  For a fuller discussion, see (Lindert 
1998). 
This point seems to have been missed by the otherwise excellent 
/ 
coverage of  recent UK class differentials in housing costs by Crawford (1996, 
89-90), who views the opportunity cost of  wealth tied up in owner-occupied 
housing as a user-cost part of  the cost-of-living deflator for income measures 
that failed to include the full value of  that housing.  Yet Crawford does 
usefully capture the capital-gain effects in his user-cost measure. 
Page 44 "  On mortality trends by class and age group, see Hollingsworth 
(1977); R.V. Jackson (1994); Wrigley and Schofield (1981); Wrigley et al. (1997); 
Woods (1988-89, 1993); Williamson (1984); Lindert (1994a); Floud and Harris 
(1996). 
l2 The phrase "wage and salary rates" is chosen over "wages and 
salaries1' or "earnings" in order to set aside the changes in male / female 
income inequality that reflect differing trends in the annual labor hours and 
labor-force participation of  women.  As argued elsewhere (Lindert and 
-Williamson 1983, pp. 17-19; Lindert 1991, p. 374), it seems wiser to focus on 
the wage-price of  a unit of  a woman's time as a measure of  her earning 
potential.  This approach strikes a compromise between the extremes of 
valuing women's unpaid time at zero and valuing it above the wage rate (as 
would be valid for women who actually choose to work zero hours for pay). 
Most of  the literature still adheres to the former extreme view, interpreting 
non-participation in the labor force, or any reduction of  hours worked, as a 
shift toward a use of  women's time that is worth zero. 
l3  Recently Lars Osberg and Fazley Siddiq (1988) have argued that 
slaves should be counted as having had ne~ative  net worth, equal to (minus) 
£155 per slave household in 1774, because their freedom was denied them. 
On this basis they conclude that colonial wealth inequality was much greater 
than today's wealth inequality.  The assumption and interpretation do not 
seem valid.  They offer no defense of  the large absolute value of  £155 per 
slave household, which nearly equals the mean wealth of  all households at 
the time.  Why not El or £10,000, and what is such a valuation (of freedom?) 
doing in  a distribution of  capital excluding free people's ownership of  their 
own human capital?  And why choose a value so large that this arbitrary 
valuation of  negative Southern wealth drives the whole conclusion about all 
13 colonies?  The conventional procedure followed here at least lends itself to 
familiar interpretations.  In addition, their interpretation should have 
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colonial egalit6 toward greater inequalities, starting from the relatively non- 
slave 1630 and rising for over a century, possibly risiig all the way to 1860 
(depending on what negative values they would put on the net worth of 
slaves who had a higher real price in 1860 than back in 1774). 
l4 For a list of  relevant colonial wealth studies by Bruce Daniels, Allan 
Kulikoff, James Lemon, Gloria Main, Jack Main, Gary Nash, Daniel Scott 
Smith, and Gerard Warden, and others, see Williamson and Lindert (1981). 
l5 The inequality trend implied by the rise in the slave share of  the 
population across the colonial era was pointed out by Robert Gallman (1981, 
p. 233). 
l6 For an extensive survey, see Williamson and Lindert (1981).  A 
more recent contribution, one that follows individuals over time, is Steckel 
(1994). 
l7 The values of  non-resident Loyalist estates available for confiscation 
as of  the 1770s are sketched by Shammas (1993). We still need better post- 
Revolutionary numbers, however, on who acquired these assets. 
l8 The underlying data here are Richard Easterlin's estimates of  state 
and regional income, as reproduced in Fogel and Engerman (1971) and in the 
Historical Statistics of  the United States, and as transformed into an inequality 
measure in the earlier article by Williamson (1965).  The measurement of 
real, as opposed to nominal, regional income gaps is pursued with spatial 
cost-of-living indices in Coelho and Shepherd (1976) and Williamson and 
Lindert (1980, Ch. 5).  The real gaps move like the nominal ones, albeit at 
lower levels of  inequality.  For a recent overview of  the regional inequality 
motif, see Nissan and Carter (1993). 
l9 See Jenkins (1995) on both the alternative trend series and the 
decompositions by population group, and also Atkinson and Micklewright 
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Coder (1995), Atkinson (1996, 1997), and Goodman et al. (1997) on the trends. 
20  In addition to the series shown in Table 4 and Figure 5, see 
Blackburn and Bloom (1987,1994); Danziger and Gottschalk (1993,1995); and 
Raj and Slottje (1994). 
21  The author thanks Claudia Goldin, Lawrence Katz, Lawrence 
Mishel, and the U.S. Census Bureau for guidance on the mis-measurement of 
top U.S. incomes.  My attempts to produce better estimates of  incomes above 
the 95th percentile with the help of  tax-return data have been unsuccessful, 
leaving Table 5 and Figure 6 as the best set of  indirect clues. 
22  The computable-general-equilibrium (CGE) exercises performed by 
Williamson and Lindert should be extended in a number of  directions.  First, 
the model should be complicated to include more than four factors of 
production and more than three output sectors, including input-output ratios 
between the output sectors.  Second, it could incorporate forces that shift 
product demand, such as tariff policy and transportation costs, as Williamson 
(1974) did when analyzing growth rather than inequality.  Third, it could be 
used to explain movements in the relative returns to non-human property, 
as O'Rourke et al. (1996) have done for international patterns of  movements 
in land rents. 
23 See Lawrence and Slaughter (1993); Murphy and Welch (1993); 
Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994); Wood (1994, 1995); Katz, Blanchflower, 
and Loveman (1995); Burtless (1995); Feenstra and Hanson (1995); Richardson 
(1995); and the whole Januhry 1995 issue of  the New York Federal Reserve 
Bank's Economic Policy Review. 
24  Bear in mind that the only government interventions being 
considered here are taxes and transfers, with no attention to industrial 
relations laws, incomes policies, and other less-budgetary tools of 
government. 
Page 47 Note also that the text here is considering the effect of  taxation on 
income equalization, not its effect on wealth equalization.  The fisc's share of 
the credit for wealth equalization might be different from its share of  the 
income equalization.  In particular, it could be that a greater share of  the 
wealth equalization achieved by 1938 was due to taxation of  high unearned 
incomes, and less to other forces, than for the income movements featured 
here. 
25  In the absence of  detailed calculations about feedbacks from tax- 
transfer regressivity to pre-fisc income inequality, all we have are the kinds of 
studies that document the co-existence of  the two movements, by 
decomposing the sources of  change in a-fisc  inequality.  Thus for the 
United Kingdom between 1979 and 1988, Johnson and Webb (1993) estimate 
that the changes in the tax-benefit system account for 43 percent of  the shift in 
post-tax-and-transfer income inequality, versus only 23 percent for the 
widening of  earnings, 29 percent for the rise in unemployment, and 5 percent 
residual noise.  As the text makes clear, that effect of  the tax-transfer system 
must have come after 1984. 
26 "Land" here should include mineral and forest rights. 
Bourguignon and Morrisson (1990) have rightly stressed the importance of 
mineral rights in explaining international differences in inequality and 
skewness. 
27  Here the text concentrates on trends in Britain and other European 
settings, where the earlier settings remained highly unequal and average 
.incomes grew across the nineteenth century.  In such settings the paradox 
predicts a drift toward poo'r relief.  For early America, the trend predictions of 
the paradox are mixed:  Per-capita income growth across the nineteenth 
century would favor giving more to the poor, but the rise in inequality would 
cause less to be given. 
Page 48 28  One exception relates to the distribution of  poor relief across the 
parishes of  England in the Old Poor Law era 1780-1834. In that case, tax-based 
poor relief was indeed most generous where poverty was greatest, namely in 
the rural Southeast.  This pattern has been well explained by George Boyer 
(1985) as a reflection of  differences in the lobbying power of  labor-hiring 
landlords.  In the southeast such landlords had disproportionate power in 
local government, and outvoted the non-hiring family farmers, raising local 
poor rates so as to keep the poor around during the winter. 
29  Some initial headway into the three-way relationship between 
income inequality, redistribution, and political voice has been made 
empirically by Lindert (1994b, 1996) and Barro (1996), and theoretically in a 
new model by Acemoglu and Robinson (1996). 
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Page 62 Table 1.  Income Inequality Trends in the United Kingdom, 1688 - 1994 
A.  Rough estimates for earlv benchmark years 
Shares of pre-tax nominal personal income received by 
Top 5% of  Top 20% of  Nominal 
households  households  Gini x 100 
England and Wales 
1688 (King, revised)  35.6  58.1  55.6 
1759 (Massie, revised)  35.4  57.5  52.2 
1801  /03 (Colquhoun, revised)  39.2  63.2  59.3 
1867 (Baxter, revised)  41.2  57.3  49.0 
United Kingdom 
1867 (Baxter, revised)  41.1  57.7  50.6 
1911 (Bowley revised)  38.7  55.2  48.3 
B.  Inland Revenue, Survev of  Personal Incomes (SPI) 
Financial  Shares of  pre-tax income received by 
year be-  Top l0lo  of  Top 5% of  Top 20% of 
ginning  tax units  tax units  tax units 
1938  17.1  31.5  52.4 
1949  10.6  23.1  45.3 
1954  8.8  19.7  42.1 
1959  7.9  18.7  41.2 
1964  7.7  18.3  40.9 
1965  7.8  18.5  41.1 
1966  7.2  17.6  40.3 
1967  7.0  17.4  40.2 
1968  6.9  17.3  40.4 
1969  6.7  17.1  40.0 
1970  6.2  16.6  39.9 
1971  6.1  16.4  39.8 
1972  6.0  15.9  38.9 
1973  6.2  16.1  39.0 
1974  5.9  15.8  39.4 
/ 
C. CSO hybrid estimates (Blue Books) 
Financial  Shares of  pre-tax income received by 
year be-  Top 1% of  Top 5% of  Top 20% of 
ginning  tax units  tax units  tax units 
1949  11.2  23.8  47.3 
1954  9.3  20.8  45.2 




















shares (1911 base) 
Top5%  Tov 20% D.  CSO-ONS eauivalised-income series 
Financial yr.  Ori-ha1 income of  households: 
beginning  tov 20% share  Gini x 100 
1977  43  43 
1978  43  43 
1979  43  44 
1980  44  44 
1981  46  46 
1982  46  47 
1983  47  48 
1984  47  49 
1985  47  49 
1986  49  50 
1987  50  51 
1988  50  51 
1989  49  50 
1990  51  52 
1991  50  51 
1992  50  52 
1993/4  52  54 
1975 old 
1975 new 
Disposable income of  households: 
top 20%  Gini x 100 
36  27 
35  27 
36  27 
37  28 
38  28 
37  28 
38  28 
37  28 
38  29 
40  31 
41  33 
42  35 
41  34 
43  36 
42  35 
42  35 
42  34 
5.6  16.0  41.9 
5.7  16.4  42.3  37.3 
1978  5.3  16.0  42.6  37.5 
1981  6.0  17.6  45.0  40.0 
1984  6.4  18.5  46.3  41.0 Notes and sources to Table 1 and Ficure 1: 
Panel A: The main sources for the 1688-1867 rough estimates are Lindert 
and Williamson (1982,1983) and Williamson (1985),  using the full class detail, 
not just the 13-class comparisons in Table 3 of  Lindert and Williamson (1993). 
I have since revised the estimates for 1867, however, to adjust them 
from a distribution among Baxter's income-recipients to a distribution 
among households. I have done the same for the Bowley estimates of 1911, 
removing earnings of  minors and attributing them to adult-head 
households. The 1911 estimates may miss some paupers (who about 3 
percent of  the total population), causing some understatement of  inequality. 
The detailed re-calculations are available upon request. 
The "real" top-group shares are based on separate deflators for the 
incomes of  the top 5%, top 20%, and all households, 1759 - 1911, as 
explained in (Lindert 1998). The deflators differ mainly because of 
pronounced movements in the relative prices of  food and rent versus 
all commodities.  Since the data on nominal incomes excluded income from 
owner-occupied housing, this housing should also be excluded from the 
cost-of-living bundle for the upper classes.  The variant shown here assumes 
that the occupant-owned share of  all housing was 100% for the top 5% of 
households, 67% for the next IS%, and 0% for the bottom 80% of  households. 
Panel B:  Royal Commission (1977, pp. 240-3). 
Panel C:  The CSO hybrid estimates combine data from the SPI and the 
Family Expenditure Survey (FES), as reported in in the May 1978, July 1984, 
and November 1987 issues of  Economic Trends. 
In this series CSO defines households as "individual tax-units, 
i.e. married couples or single people over school-leaving age not at school." 
(Economic Trends, November 1987, p. 94.) 
Panel D:  The source is the set of  articles in Economic Trends entitled 
"The Effects of  Taxes and Benefits on Household Income", here cited from 
the December 1994, December 1999, and March 1997 issues. 
The estimates distribute equivalised original income among households 
ranked by equivalised disposable (not original) income, except for the 
Gini coefficients on original income, which seem to be (correctly) ranked 
by original income. "Equivalised" here means that income has been 
divided by "equivalised persons" in the household, using the McClements 
scale as explained in Economic Trends, December 1995, p. 57. Table 2.  Wealth Inequality Trends in the United Kingdom, 1670 - 1989 
Shares of  aggregate marketable net worth 
Eneland and Wales 










































































































58.7 UK  marketable  UK  personal net worth including 
personal net worth  all ~rivate  and state pensions 
Top 1%  Top 5%  Top 1%  Top 5% 
of  adults  of  adults  of  adults  of  adults 
21  38  13  26 
22  39  14  27 
20  37  13  26 
20  37  12  25 
19  36  11  24 
18  36  11  24 
18  36  11  .  -  24 
20  37  11  24 
18  35  10  23 
18  36  11  25 
18  36  11  24 
Sources and notes to Table 2: 
The minimum age of  independent adulthood varies in the estimates, as in society. 
For the pre-1900 estimates, this is assumed to be 20 years. Atkinson and Harrison assume 
that it  dropped linearly from 23 years in 1923 to 20 years in 1953 and 18 years in 1973. 
The sources are Lindert (1986) for 1688-1875; Atkinson and Harrison (1978, 
pp. 139,159) for 1911/13 - 1972; and Central Statistical Office, Economic Trends, 
November 1991 for the United Kingdom 1976-1989. 
The 1911/13 figure originates from Daniels and Campion, and Atkinson and Harrison 
(pp. 143-146) warn that the Daniels and Campion measures are not fully comparable 
with later estimates. Table 3.  Wealth Inequality in the United States, 
Benchmark Measures, 1774 - 1989. 
Net Worth  Total Assets 
Percent shares held by  Percent shares held by 
topl%  top10%  top 1 %  top 10%  Glnl 
1774 (Alice Hanson Jones) 
All households  16.5  59.0  14.8  55.1 
Free households  14.3  53.2  0.694  12.6  49.6  0.642 
All adult males  16.5  58.4  13.2  54.3 
Free adult males  14.2  52.5  0.688  12.4  48.7  0.632 
Census samples (Lee Soltow): 
1860, all adult males 
1860, free adult males 
1870, all adult males 
1890, families (G.K. Holrnes) 
Households:  1922 
(Wol£f-  peak = 1929 
Marley  1933 
series, as  1939 
revised  1945 
in Wolff  1949 










1989 Notes and sources to Table 3 and Figure 3: 
The 1774 estimates are based on 919 probated estates, from Alice Hanson Jones 
(1977, vol. 3, Table 8.1). These estimates follow the usual "GNP, not GDP" convention 
of  focusing on residents' incomes and (here) wealth, not on wealth held (or income 
earned) in this country by residents of all countries. For a contrary view, see Carole 
Shammas's (1993) treatment of  non-colonists' wealth in the 13 colonies. Counting 
the colonial wealth of  British residents, Shammas raises the top 1%  share of 
net worth to 18%. 
Lee Soltow's spin samples of  the census (1975, pp. 99,103) consist of 13,696 men 
in 1860 and 9,823 men in 1870, where men are males 20 and older. 
Tlie Holmes estimates are discussed in Williamson and Lindert (1981, p. 57). 
The Wolff-Marley estimates are the W2 estimates of  net worth and total assets 
(without household inventories) from their 1989 NBER chapter (pp. 806,809,811), 
as extended in Wolff (1995, pp. 62-63). The more detailed update is Wolff (1994). 
Figure 3's Wolff-Marley "augmented" series for the share of  net worth held 
by the top 1 percent of  households, which includes pensions and social-security 

























Table 4.  Measures of  Pre-Fisc Income Inequality 





































Top 5'!0  Top 20% 
Current Population Survey (CPS) 
families plus unrelated individuals 
(households from 1967 on) 
Top5%  Top20%  Glni 























































Top 5%  Top 20% 
19.6  45.5 
19.6  45.5 
Gini  - 
1971 























Current Population Survey (CPS) 


















































49.1 Notes and sources to Table 4 and Fipre  5: 
The Kuznets economic series (Kuznets 1953, p. 635) is the variant her preferred, for reasons given in his introduction. 
He presented his basic series in order to reach back to 1913.  Both series refer to income before taxes and to taxpaying units. 
Unlike the other series, the Kuznets series rank recipient units according to income per person. 
The OBE-Goldsmith series start from estimates by Selma Goldsmith (1967, p. xiii) and the Office of  Business 
Economics. These estimates mix different sets of  primary data. For 1929 they combine tax returns with an 
independent Brookings Institution estimation of  the entire income distribution. For 1935/36, and 1941, Goldsmith 
adjusted the results of  two household surveys. For later years the Census Bureau's CPS series were adjusted to 
the OBE-Goldsmith defiqitions of  income and recipient unit. 
The Census Bureau's CPS P-60 series refer to money incomes including cash transfers (but not in-kind transfers) 
from government. 
The Population unit for the estimates up to 1967 consists of  families and unrelated individuals living alone. 
From 1967 on, the unit is households. 
Up to 1993, the series is reported in CPS Series P60-184 ("Money Income of  Households" etc.), superceded 
in 1993 by P60-189 ("Income, Poverty, and Valuation of  Noncash Benefits"). The overlapping data for 1993 suggest 
that various changes in measurement procedure raised the top 5% share by 1% of  aggregate income, the top 20% 
share by 0.7%, and the gini by .007. The higher new-basis estimates are shown here. Table 5.  Incomes Relative to the Median Income, United States 1929-1995 
Each figure is the ratio of  the income at this percentile to the median (50th-percentile)  income. 
CPS, families plus 
unrelated individuals  CPS, households 







































CPS, families plus 
unrelated individuals  CPS, households 
Notes to Table 5 and Fipre  6: 
For the OBE-Goldsmith and families-plus unrelateds series, the median income was estimated as the 
geometric average of the two nearest quintile border incomes (Y60 and Y40). 
Y20, the border income at the top of  the bottom quintile, is derived for 1929 by special assumptions. 
First, we accept Goldsmith's estimate that the bottom quintile received 3.5% of  all consumer-unit income 
the second quintile received 9.0%.  These estimates imply respective average quintile incomes of  $409 
and $1051. Where, between these, is  the quintile border income Y20? 
In  1935/36, the same OBE-Goldsmith estimates imply that the border was .541 of  the way up from 
the bottom-quintile average income to the second-quintile average. But that was with heavy 
unemployment, which would drag down the bottom-quintile average a lot. So assume that in 1929, 
the border was exactly halfway between $409 and $1051, or $730. .,  Y 
England and Wales  United Kingdom 
65 
60 
nominal  X  X 
55  real  e 
6  (1911 base) 
+
 
%  50 
(Sources: See text and the notes to Table 1  ,) 
C 
F;  real (1911 base) 
















real (1911 base) 
c Figure 2. Wealth Inepualiq  Td  in the United Kinghm *  1875 
Share of  personal net worth 
held by top 5Yo  of  adults, 
England and Wales 
Share of  personal net worth 
held by top 170  of  adults, 
England and Wales 
Shares of  marketable personal  1  wealth in the United Kingdom, 
D  =  without pensions, top 5% 
15  A  =  with pensions, top 570 
o =  without pensions, top 1% 
A =  with pensions, top 1% 
10 Fip  3.  Wealth InepualiqTrends  in the United States 
SinCeCalanialTimes 
Hingham,  Mass., top 10% 
early local series 




Net worth,  Wheldbyb~p  1% 
Total assets  ob  U.S.  htmsddk 
o  =  Net worth, including all 
pensions and social security 
(0 Top-1% share of total assets assumed 
to be the same in  1913 as in 1929,) Fip  4.  humme lnspuality Trends in the United Kin*  since 1911 
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Bowley, xwised  equivalised  f 
1 --  --  -  -  --  households  I  4  50  f 
original income 
Bowley, xwised 
SPI (tax units) 
5 -  -  -. 
Shares of  pre-tax 
income received 
by top 5 90 
(see Table 1) Figure 5.  humme hapaliq  lknds  in the United States since  1913 
A  OBE - Goldsmith top 2070  \ (mnsumer units) 
\  A 
\  A%- 
(households) 
(consumer units) 
CPS top 5% 
(households) 
Kuznets top 1'30 
(income recipients) median income 
80th-percentile income 
oqo 
median income  B-8" 
A = OBE  - Goldsmith consumer units 
A = CPS  families plus unrelated individuals 
o  = CPS  households 